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ABSTRACT
This research examines environmental dispute resolution as applied to Superfund site
cleanup and how the use of collaborative dispute resolution approaches, in particular
Alternative Dispute Resolution and Community Involvement, are related to a
community’s

socioeconomic

and

demographic

profile.

It

examines

the

sociodemographic characteristics of residents living in census tracts containing
Superfund sites in relation to the type of dispute resolution technique used. I
hypothesize that collaborative dispute resolution techniques, as opposed to traditional
settlement and/or litigation, are less likely to occur in Superfund communities with high
poverty levels and high minority populations than in those with low poverty levels and
low minority populations. Although minority and lower class communities are less likely
to be placed on the National Priorities List (NPL), are slower to be cleaned up once on
the NPL, and experience lower quality cleanups (O’Neil 2005; Sigman 2001;
Omohundro 2004), the findings of this research indicate that the dispute resolution
processes studied here do not contribute to such environmental clean up injustices.
Minority status and poverty levels do not impact the likelihood that collaborative dispute
resolution will be used in settling Superfund disputes. This analysis does show a
significant correlation between education and the use of collaborative dispute resolution.
Superfund communities in which residents have low educational attainment are less
likely to use collaborative dispute resolution. Low educational levels may be the
paramount disadvantage to overcome in the use and successful implementation of
collaborative dispute resolution.
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A. INTRODUCTION
For 25 years, controversy and criticism have surrounded the Superfund program.
Critics have characterized the program as inefficient, excessively costly, and unjust with
respect to both communities and industrial offenders. The contention and dispute within
the remediation process are among the major factors that contribute to delays and high
transaction costs.

Superfund site remediation is fraught with conflict between

stakeholders – between polluters, government regulators, and community groups;
between federal and state agencies responsible for cleanup; between lawyers and
environmental insurers; and between technical experts and government officials at all
levels. These controversies often lead to greater expenditures on settling disputes than
on the actual remediation of the contaminated site.

While many empirical studies have described and quantified the legal, economic, and
environmental outcomes of Superfund, none have looked at how the specific dispute
resolution processes that contribute to these outcomes are related to community
characteristics.

As summarized by Church and Nakamura (2003), the Superfund

legislation broadly allows the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to take one of
three approaches in working with polluters and other stakeholders to settle cleanup
related disputes: (1) prosecutorial, (2) accommodation, or (3) public works.

The

prosecutorial approach takes a hard-line, demanding approach with polluters; the
accommodation approach emphasizes negotiation, collaboration, and avoidance of
litigation; and the public works approach involves more direct action by the EPA itself in
1

cleaning up sites. Though the use of these approaches varies by EPA region, the
extent to which community characteristics influence the selection of Superfund dispute
resolution processes is not well understood (Church and Nakamura 1993; GAO 2000).

The purpose of this research is to add to the body of knowledge on environmental
dispute resolution as applied to Superfund site cleanup and how collaborative dispute
resolution approaches are related to a community’s socioeconomic and demographic
profile. The approaches studied here are those that emphasize accommodation, faceto-face deliberations, problem solving, and consensus building among stakeholders as
opposed to dispute resolution through court-based litigation. According to Bingham,
less adversarial approaches to environmental dispute resolution include “a variety of
approaches that allow the parties to meet face-to-face to reach a mutually acceptable
resolution of the issues in dispute or potentially controversial situation … that involve
some form of consensus building, joint problem solving, or negotiation” (Bingham, 1986,
p xv).

While this can include many forms of public discourse, this study looks

specifically at:

1. Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) as it is applied by the EPA within the
Superfund enforcement process; and

2. Community Involvement (CI) as a means of public participation in Superfund site
decision-making.

2

ADR is defined here as all dispute resolution approaches in which a neutral third party is
used to reduce the probability of litigation. Techniques include, but are not limited to:
advisory

ADR

processes,

conciliation

procedures,

mediation,

arbitration,

and

aggregating cases for settlement. CI can also take various forms, including the use of
formally constructed Community Advisory Groups (CAGS), the carrying out of activities
funded through Technical Assistance Grants (TAGS), and other forms of organized
collective community action.

While the EPA is required by law to allow public

participation, communities take advantage of this to a greater or lesser degree, such
that at many Superfund sites, CI does not meaningfully occur.

Several key findings suggest this as an important area for investigation. First, past
research has shown that, compared to litigation, ADR is less costly, leads to a more
rapid settlement, results in greater participant satisfaction, and is less stressful for the
community at large (Marshall, Picou, and Schlichtmann 2004). The EPA states that it
lowers transaction costs, focuses more on real issues rather than posturing, leads to
settlements more closely tailored to the parties needs, and is less time-consuming (EPA
1995). ADR has also been used by the EPA specifically as a means to give voice to
communities and to enable greater environmental justice (Consensus Building Institute
2003). In light of these advantages, it is important to know if all communities have equal
access to ADR in the context of the Superfund cleanup process.

Second, while

research into Superfund cleanup equity has been limited, some studies have found that
sites in areas having high minority populations undergo lower quality cleanups than
those in low minority areas (Hamilton and Viscusi 1999). It is not known whether these
3

differences are due to factors stemming from collective community action (or inaction)
or

from

variations

in

the

EPA-led

processes

surrounding

site

remediation.

Understanding the relationship between community characteristics and dispute
resolution processes will help in designing strategies to empower disadvantaged
communities.

This research brings together themes of both environmental dispute resolution and
environmental justice (EJ).

There have been few studies published to date at the

intersection of ADR and the EJ movement as related to Superfund. In this research, I
examine the sociodemographic characteristics of residents living in census tracts
containing Superfund sites in relation to two indicators of participatory decision making:
the differential use of ADR and the presence or absence of formally recognized CI as
compared to traditional dispute settlement or litigation.

Both ADR and CI are

considered to be on a continuum of participatory decision making and collaborative
dispute resolution, with CI being at the less formal end and ADR being at the more
strictly defined and formally regulated end.

Given the frequency and emphasis placed on a community’s race and class in the EJ
literature, I chose to examine the relationship between the sociodemographic profile of
Superfund communities and the use of collaborative dispute resolution approaches
(ADR and/or CI). Minorities are more likely to live in toxic communities and are less
likely to be active in community participatory dispute resolution (Bullard, Mohai, Saha,
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and Wright/UCC 2007). Therefore, this research begins to answer the question: Does
the class or race of Superfund site residents affect the likelihood that ADR/CI will occur
during the site cleanup and enforcement processes?

Hypothesis 1.

ADR/CI, as opposed to settlement/litigation, is less likely to occur in

Superfund communities with high poverty levels than in those with low poverty
levels;

Hypothesis 2.

ADR/CI, as opposed to settlement/litigation, is less likely to occur in

Superfund communities with higher minority representation than in those with
lower minority representation;

Hypothesis 3.

ADR/CI, as opposed to settlement/litigation, is less likely to occur in

Superfund communities with more single parent households than in those with
less single parent households;

Hypothesis 4.

ADR/CI, as opposed to settlement/litigation, is less likely to occur in

Superfund communities with less formal education than in those with more formal
education.

Poverty and the effect of racial disadvantage (i.e. being of African American, AsianPacific-Islander, Native American or of some other descent) may decrease the
likelihood of ADR/CI use for a number of reasons. Using similar reasoning to Daley and
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Layton (2004), the Administrative Convenience/Transaction Costs model posits that
bureaucrats are self-interested individuals who seek to attain their goals rationally
(Downs 1967).

As applied to Superfund cleanup and likelihood of ADR use, it is

hypothesized here that the EPA will tend to reach an unaided settlement (one not
requiring either ADR or litigation) with Potentially Responsible Parties (PRPs) more
easily in communities where residents lack political power.

If such a settlement is

reached at an early stage in the enforcement process, neither ADR nor litigation will be
required to compel cleanup by PRPs. It is in the self-interest of bureaucrats to bring
each site to resolution as quickly as possible to offset criticisms that the Superfund
program is inefficient and ineffective. This may, however, require that the EPA accept
less stringent remediation approaches from PRPs, compromises that may go
unchallenged in communities lacking political power.

Secondly, as related to cases where community members themselves take part in ADR
processes focused on remedy selection, factors related to political and personal
resources may also decrease the likelihood of ADR use. Involvement in ADR requires
disputants to possess various organizational and political skills (making timely phone
calls, getting ADR regional specialist involvement, getting sponsorship from Regional
Counsel, and ultimate approval from EPA officers).

Communities with depressed

socioeconomic status or those with higher minority populations may be less likely than
more affluent, non-minority communities to have the time and/or financial resources to
accomplish the steps required to initiate and follow through with ADR initiatives.

6

CI is considered a form of collective action. The collective interest model, originally
proposed by Finkel, Muller, and Opp (1989) and adapted by Lubell (2002) argues that
“environmental activism is a function of citizen beliefs about collective benefits, the
ability to influence collective outcomes, and the selective costs/benefits of participation.”
(p. 431) It has been asserted by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights that
disadvantaged communities have less access to technical data, research, and other
information necessary for effective community action (USCOCR 2003).

Such

communities may be less able to take advantage of Technical Assistance Grants
(TAGs) and Community Involvement training offered by the EPA. In this research, it is
hypothesized that because disadvantaged communities have less collective selfefficacy and less access to informational resources, they are less likely to engage in CI.
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B. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW
B.1. Superfund/CERCLA
In December 1980, following the 10th anniversary of Earth Day and amid toxic waste
fires in New Jersey and contamination at Love Canal, President Carter signed the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA). President Carter stated that CERCLA was “landmark in its scope and
impact on preserving the environmental quality of our country and that it fills a major
gap in the existing laws of our country.” CERCLA, or Superfund as it is more commonly
known, was formed primarily to deal with cleaning up hazardous waste sites where
owners had shirked responsibility, but also to allow injured parties to sue in Federal
court for damages. The EPA administers the Superfund program, in cooperation with
state and tribal governments (EPA 2000c).

Subsequent legislation was passed in 1986, the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act (SARA), which amended CERCLA in a number of ways. SARA
stressed the importance of permanent remedies and innovative treatment technologies
over more temporary ones; required greater coordination between Superfund and other
environmental laws; provided new enforcement authorities and settlement tools;
increased state involvement; encouraged greater citizen participation in making
decisions on how sites should be cleaned up; and increased the size of the trust fund.

CERCLA also created another agency, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease
Registry

(ATSDR),

to

investigate

the impacts of contaminants on public health
8

and to undertake public health measures.

The ATSDR conducts public health

assessments at Superfund sites and maintains a prioritized list of hazardous
substances and their toxicological profiles. The agency also conducts epidemiological
surveillance and provides physician education related to the health effects of hazardous
substances.

Most toxic sites, comprising 65-70% of the total, are waste storage and treatment
facilities, landfills, or former industrial properties. Many have been abandoned and most
are contaminated by multiple toxic substances. A smaller number are active or inactive
waste recycling facilities and mining sites.

Federal government facilities, such as

military bases and nuclear energy complexes, also make up a significant portion of
overall sites (ATSDR 1997). In a study done in 1996, the ATSDR estimated that
approximately 11 million people live within one mile of Superfund sites. A significantly
higher percentage of minorities live near Superfund sites than in other parts of the
affected counties (Reisch and Bearden 1997; Bullard, Mohai, Saha, and Wright/UCC
2007).

The extent of exposure to hazardous substances among people living near Superfund
sites is unknown. However, exposure assessment studies conducted by the ATSDR
show that compounds such as lead, arsenic, mercury, polychlorinated biphenyls
(PCBs), and bromides are found at levels posing a health concern in people living near
some hazardous waste sites. Exposure studies focusing on lead show that soil is the
most common pathway of exposure among children living near hazardous waste sites.
9

Other studies have demonstrated increased exposure to several compounds from
consuming contaminated vegetables, beef, milk, and fish raised and caught near
hazardous waste sites (ATSDR 1997).

Under the Polluters Pay Principal, Superfund requires the cleanup costs at each site to
be divided among those who dumped the wastes, known as Potentially Responsible
Parties (PRPs). The basic legal tool by which the EPA compels cleanup is the system
of tort liability under which PRPs are forced, by litigation or the threat of litigation, into
paying the costs of remediation. Such liability is joint and several, implying that any
PRP can be held liable for the entire cleanup, regardless of the extent to which they
caused it. The issue of intent is also removed under the provision for strict liability, such
that PRPs can be required to pay cleanup costs even when toxic releases were
unintentional and without negligence.

Sites where PRPs cannot be identified or are

bankrupt are known as “orphan sites.” They are eligible for cleanup if they pose a
substantial enough threat.

Some sites have orphan shares, such that the federal

government agrees to pay for a portion of costs for contamination contributed by
missing PRPs.

The EPA’s inventory of hazardous waste sites is known as the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Information System (CERCLIS).
It contains sites that have been prioritized for cleanup as well as potentially hazardous
sites requiring preliminary investigation. The presence of a site in CERCLIS does not
address liability for cleanup and does not indicate that cleanup will actually take place.
10

(See section B.2. for a summary of the cleanup process). EPA achieves sites within
CERCLIS when the site is designated as No Further Response Action Planned
(NFRAP). Information for CERCLIS is provided primarily through the regional program
offices, through a Regional Information Management Coordinator.

Although CERCLIS contains many known hazardous sites, far more, that are believed
to exist, have yet to be brought to EPA’s attention. According to Probst and Konisky
(2001), the Environmental Law Institute estimated that there are 69,000 hazardous sites
throughout the country. The GAO (2000) estimated the number to be substantially
greater at 150,000 - 500,000. Only a small percentage of these would be considered
serious enough to warrant cleanup through the Superfund program (Probst and Konisky
2001).

Prior to the creation of Superfund and subsequent related legislation, nothing like it had
ever existed. Over time, the program has evolved to create a regulatory framework
intended to protect human health and the environment from the dangers of hazardous
waste. Today, despite funding cutbacks and expiration of the original legislation, the
Superfund program remains the primary resource for identifying contaminated sites and
quantifying risks to health and the environment from a broad range of conditions,
chemicals, and threats at uncontrolled hazardous waste sites.

B.2. The Superfund Cleanup Process
In pursuing its mission to assure the cleanup of toxic waste sites, the EPA has
established a formal process for waste site

assessment and cleanup. Exceptions to
11

this process occur when the site is seen as an emergency due to the degree of the
threat to public health. If imminent danger exists, the EPA can undertake cleanup itself
and seek cost recoveries from PRPs after the fact. In most cases, however, the series
of steps for non-emergent sites are:

Site Discovery and Notification - The EPA is notified of actual or threatened releases of
hazardous substances by private citizens, state agencies, or EPA regional offices. The
site is then entered into CERCLIS.

Preliminary Assessment/Site Inspection (PA/SI) - A limited-scope investigation is
performed on every CERCLIS site to distinguish between sites that are not harmful and
those requiring further investigation.

When this is complete, on-scene coordinators

submit a preliminary assessment report to the regional and national response team,
specifying whether the site falls under the jurisdiction of Superfund and whether it will
move on to ranking within the Hazardous Ranking System (HRS) process.

Inclusion on the National Priorities List (NPL) – For a contaminated site to be cleaned
up under the Superfund program, it must first achieve a priority level that will allow
placement on the NPL. The first NPL was announced in 1983, with 406 priority sites
identified. It is updated regularly based on the evaluation of both new sites and the
progress of cleanup at sites already on the NPL.

EPA policy states that the Hazardous Ranking System (HRS) is the principal
mechanism for deciding whether to place a site on the NPL. Inclusion on the NPL
12

requires a score greater than 28.5 on the HRS scale. Alternatively, a site can be placed
on the NPL based on state nomination (states can only nominate one site) or
recognition of the site as an imminent health threat by the ATSDR.

After a site has been placed on the NPL, it may then qualify for federal funding and may
also receive regional or national attention. If a site is not determined to be of high
enough priority to make the NPL, it may still be eligible for cleanup under state or
voluntary programs.

The objectivity of the NPL listing process has been widely questioned by environmental
justice researchers. (See section B.4., Environmental Cleanup Justice) Some have
provided substantial evidence that placement of a site on the NPL is more related to
political power and community influence than to the physical characteristics of the site
(Hamilton and Viscusi 1999; Sigman 2001).

Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study (RI/FS) – For sites that are placed on the
NPL, a RI/FS is performed to determine the nature of the contamination and the
recommended remediation approach. The RI and FS are conducted concurrently. The
PRP may conduct the RI/FS if EPA determines that they are qualified. If conducted by
the EPA, the EPA will then seek reimbursement from PRPs for its associated costs.
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Record of Decision (ROD) – The findings from the RI/FS are used to generate a ROD, a
formal document by which an EPA administrator (usually the Regional Administrator)
specifies the remedy for cleaning up Superfund site.

Remedial Design (RD)/Remedial Action (RA) – During the RD phase, the technical
specifications for cleanup remedies and technologies chosen and described in the ROD
are designed. It includes engineering plans and specifications. The actual site work
(RA) can then begin.

Long term Operation and Maintenance (O&M) - O&M activities are intended to protect
the integrity of the remediated site.

Monitoring includes such things as inspection,

sampling and analysis, routine maintenance, and reporting.

NPL Site Deletion - EPA may remove a site from the NPL if it determines that no further
action is needed.

As these steps suggest, this is a lengthy and highly expensive process. The average
total time required to complete these steps is approximately eight years and the
average cost of remediating a site, excluding legal expenses and other transaction
costs, exceeds $30 million (Church and Nakamura 1993).

States also have an important role in hazardous waste site cleanup. Thousands of sites
that are not on the NPL (and are therefore ineligible for federal cleanup funds) are being
cleaned up under State Superfund programs. States may be involved in Superfund

14

enforcement activities and often participate in negotiations with PRPs.

In certain

situations, the EPA finances State-led enforcement activities. Many voluntary cleanups
by PRPs also occur at non-NPL sites. In these instances, owners of sites may clean
them up in anticipation of real estate transactions or due to fear of future liability.

Since CERCLA’s creation and implementation, the program has faced continuous
growth. Fewer than 5 percent of the approximately 1,200 toxic waste sites currently on
the NPL have been cleaned up completely and approximately 75% of the sites are in
the early stages of cleanup (EPA 2000c).

B.3. Environmental Justice
For many years, the United States population was largely unaware of how the dumping
of industrial and military wastes would affect public health and the environment.
Indiscriminate dumping of toxic materials was standard practice on thousands of
properties, resulting in landfills, warehouses and lakes contaminated by hazardous
waste. In the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, awareness of chronically polluted areas
increased with such incidents as Love Canal and Cancer Alley. During this time, there
were also large-scale technological disasters, such as Three Mile Island and the Santa
Barbara Oil Spill, which further fueled public concern about contamination.

Unfortunately, communities of color and less affluent communities have been the
hardest hit by contamination.

In response to environmental inequities, the

environmental justice movement emerged and today remains a potent force (Bullard
1983; UCOC/CRJ 1987). The EPA defines

EJ as “the fair treatment and meaningful
15

involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with
respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws,
regulations, and policies.

Fair treatment means that no group of people, including

racial, ethnic, or socioeconomic group, should bear a disproportionate share of the
negative environmental consequences resulting from industrial, municipal, and
commercial operations or the execution of federal, state, local, and tribal programs and
policies. Meaningful involvement means that: (1) potentially affected community
residents have an appropriate opportunity to participate in decisions about a proposed
activity that will affect their environment and/or health; (2) the public’s contribution can
influence the regulatory agency’s decision; (3) the concerns of all participants involved
will be considered in the decision making process; and (4) the decision makers seek out
and facilitate the involvement of those potentially affected” (EPA 2004).

Over the last twenty years, the EJ movement has substantially impacted public policy
and industry practices, held national conferences, and inspired research and curriculum
development. The EJ movement reached the White House in 1994 with the signing of
Executive Order 12898.

This order required the EPA to create an Office on

Environmental Equity and led to the initiation of many other policies and programs.
President Clinton further expanded upon such policies. Beginning in 2000, EJ initiatives
met resistance from inside the EPA as well as within Congress and today still face

16

budget and program cuts. Regardless, EJ milestones are vast, ranging from grassroots
organizations to formalized research and direct influence on national governmental
policy (Bullard, Mohai, Saha, and Wright/UCC 2007).

Even with the many EJ milestones, America’s people of color still make up the majority
of those living in neighborhoods containing hazardous waste facilities. These racial and
ethnic disparities are prevalent not only on a national basis, but also throughout all EPA
regions and metropolitan areas. Overall, people of color are 1.9 times more likely to live
in communities containing hazardous waste facilities as compared to non-minorities
(Bullard, Mohai, Saha, and Wright/UCC 2007). Minorities have a higher excess lifetime
cancer risk from Superfund sites than non-minorities and make up a higher percentage
of site-related cancer cases than their national population percentage (Hamilton and
Viscusi 1999).

However, such findings are not unequivocal in relation to Superfund. Greenberg (1994)
looked at HRS rankings in relation to the race and ethnicity of area residents. He found
no relationship between HRS rankings and minority status. A study by Clean Sites
(1990) also reported no relationship between poverty and the location of hazardous
waste sites. Others have questioned the empirical foundations of environmental justice
research, pointing to methodological flaws in a variety of studies (Liu 2000; Bowen
2002).

These findings highlight the need for further exploration of this topic.

17

B.4. Environmental Cleanup Justice
Despite the widely accepted assertion that minorities and the poor are at greater risk for
exposure to environmental hazards, they are under-represented in the Superfund
program as measured by the likelihood that a given toxic site will be placed on the NPL
(O’Neil 2007). O’Neil (2005) found that sites in high minority areas take substantially
longer to get to the NPL, if they are listed at all, and that census tracts with NPL sites
have a lower than average percentage of female-headed households and a higher
mean percentage of children. Sites with identifiable PRPs are more likely to reach
Superfund listing, most likely due to their ability to provide cleanup funding.
Communities with higher income and educational levels were also found to be more
likely to be listed on the NPL. O’Neil notes the importance of political influence to NPL
listing, as the support of community and local officials is necessary for a site to reach
NPL (O’Neil 2005).

Other research has suggested that the power of interest groups has more to do with
NPL placement than any objective ranking system. Sigman (2001) contends that
bureaucracies set their workload priorities based on pressures from concentrated
private interests. She examined the amount of time that sites on the NPL require to
complete the three stages from listing to cleanup, using an econometric method for
multiple sequential durations. Her conclusion was that little evidence exists to support
the assertion that the EPA prioritizes sites according to their harms.

Rather, the

decision is primarily related to action by concentrated private interests, such as PRPs
and local communities, which act to influence EPA priorities (Sigman 2001).
18

Omohundro (2004), in looking at citizen involvement in contaminated communities,
concluded that EPA mitigation responses are formulated on a case-by-case basis,
concluding only that the HRS score provides guidance in determining the placement of
a site on the NPL. Two additional studies also found inequities in cleanup linked to race,
though not to income (Hird 1993; Anderton, Oakes, and Egan 1997).

There is evidence that sites in areas having high minority populations undergo lower
quality cleanups than those in low minority areas. Cleanups in high minority areas are
completed with equal speed, but remediation methods appear to vary in relation to the
racial and ethnic profile of the community (Hamilton and Viscusi 1999). At least one
study has found that communities with high minority populations had fewer Superfund
site cleanup plans as reflected by Records of Decision than low minority communities
(Zimmerman 1993).

Lavelle and Coyle (1992) found that the EPA chooses

“containment” over “permanent treatment” more often at sites located in minority areas
than in non-minority areas.

B.5. Superfund Enforcement
The enforcement process that begins simultaneously with the cleanup (as described in
Section B.2.) is of particular interest because ADR/CI is most likely to occur in this
context. As defined by the EPA, the enforcement process refers to “the actions that
EPA takes to reach settlement or to compel responsible parties to pay for or undertake
the remediation of the site” (EPA 1988). Enforcement begins with the search for the
PRPs and is handled concurrently as a parallel process alongside technical
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remediation. Most PRPs enter into settlements or voluntarily comply with administrative
orders, rather than litigating or seeking other means of dispute resolution with the
government (EPA 1987).

In the enforcement process, the EPA searches for the PRPs, and once identified, they
issue an enforcement letter informing them of their general liability. At the time that the
EPA informs each PRP of their potential liability, they also express their willingness to
enter into settlement negotiations and provide the PRPs with detailed information
regarding the site characteristics (Atlas 2000). The EPA then refrains from any action at
the site for 120 days.

The first 60 days provide the PRPs with an opportunity to

negotiate a cleanup plan and allocate costs among themselves. During this period,
PRPs may bring in a third party neutral to help them in reaching an agreement. The
second 60 days allow time for the PRPs and the EPA to negotiate a proposal and its
execution (Atlas 2000).

When PRPs and the EPA fail to arrive at a satisfactory

settlement within the allowable time period, litigation or alternative methods for dispute
resolution are brought in. Exceptions to this general sequence of events can occur in
cases of a pressing immediate public health threat.

Traditionally, litigation was used by the EPA to compel PRPs to undertake cleanup
when settlement could not be reached. Critics have said that this emphasis on liability
leads to more arguments than cleanups with more resources devoted to dispute
resolution than to cleanup. A RAND corporation study published in 1992 reported that
approximately one-tenth (12%) of the money spent by insurance companies to settle
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Superfund environmental claims was used to clean up hazardous materials. Eightyeight percent of the money from the insurance companies goes to legal fees and related
costs. Insurance companies spent an estimated $470 million on Superfund-related
claims in 1989, almost twice their 1986 expenditures (Haggerty 1992). 1

The time and money involved in litigation are often cited as reasons for the slow clean
up at Superfund sites. Many cases involve the federal government, industrial polluters,
insurance companies, small businesses, and individuals. For example, at a site on
Long Island, the EPA identified 257 PRPs as being responsible for cleanup estimated to
cost almost $8 million. The 257 PRPs sued a total of 442 insurance companies, and
the site owner sued an additional 101 parties. Well over 200 law firms were hired and a
lengthy legal battle ensued (Kamieniecki and Steckenrider 1997).

B.6. The Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Movement
The alternative dispute resolution (ADR) movement began in the late 1960’s as a
populist attempt to return the dispute resolution process to disputants.

Early ADR

proponents aimed to take disputes out of courtrooms and into neighborhood justice
centers.

The movement worked to substitute mediation processes (in which the

disputants are active in finding solutions to their problems) for adjudicative processes
that assign control of outcomes to a neutral third party. The movement believed that

1

Data are based four national insurance carriers receiving 13,000 claims related to hazardous waste
cleanups.
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this would allow disputants to negotiate outcomes more appropriate to their situation,
that were more satisfactory, and that were more likely to contribute to the continuation
of long-term relationships between disputing parties (Hensler 1991).

During the 1970’s, the ADR movement entered the courtroom. In court settings, ADR
became an efficiency mechanism, designed to speed disposition and decrease
transaction costs by offering a satisfactory substitute for trial.

Unlike the populist

reformers, court reformers did not seek to change either the outcome of court disputes
or the core rules underlying court dispute resolution. Court-annexed procedures
frequently have been sold to attorneys and repeat-player litigants on the ground that
they will not change the overall distribution of case outcomes (Hensler 1991).

There is also a third stream in the ADR movement, the privately contracted resolution of
disputes between commercial partners. This part of the ADR movement actually has a
longer history than court-annexed ADR, but until recently received little attention. Unlike
other forms of ADR, these procedures require some prior understanding between the
parties about how they will resolve future disputes (Hensler 1991).

While many proponents of ADR are primarily interested in reducing the transaction
costs of civil cases, some have asked whether ADR procedures might remedy
perceived problems in court procedures for dealing with scientific questions in toxic tort
litigation.

Specifically in the case of environmental liability, courts are asked to decide

the relationship between exposure to toxic substances and the current and future health
status of entire communities.

These
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cases have generated significant debate

because of the alleged damages to litigants, the huge financial and social costs
associated with the litigation, and because outcomes are often very controversial.
Although there are many reasons why one would want to avoid litigation, some have
suggested that the problems associated with these types of cases could be mitigated by
modifying court procedures for dealing with the scientific questions on which the cases
turn (Hensler 1991).

B.7. The Use Of ADR By The EPA
Since 1981, the EPA has been progressively moving toward broader implementation of
ADR across a range of programs. Policy statements, pilot projects, and agency actions
were announced periodically from 1981 through 2000, when the EPA announced its
final ADR policy. In 1998, President Clinton established an interagency ADR committee
commissioned by the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act (ADRA). In the course of
establishing this committee, the President also instructed agencies to take steps to: (1)
promote usage of the ADR techniques including mediation, arbitration, early neutral
evaluation, agency ombuds, etc.; and (2) promote greater use of rulemaking via
negotiation. Since then, the EPA has used ADR techniques ranging from traditional
mediation to innovative processes aimed at enhancing stakeholder involvement in
decision-making.

The decision to adopt the policy advocating the use of ADR was based primarily on
perceptions among government personnel that ADR lowered transaction costs, focused
on problem-solving as opposed to positioning, created a greater opportunity to tailor
23

dispute settlements that meet stakeholder needs, and saved time (O'Leary and Raines
2001). The increased use of ADR was one of fourteen key reforms listed by the EPA in
bringing measurable improvements between 1993-1998 (GAO 2000).

The ADR techniques listed below are those that are most frequently used at EPA:

Mediation: Mediation is a confidential, informal process in which the disputing parties
use a neutral third party to assist them in trying to work out a mutually acceptable
solution to a problem. In 1999, more than 70% of all enforcement ADR cases involved
mediation (EPA 1999).

Arbitration: Arbitration is a process involving the use of a third party that hears the
issues and renders a decision.

Such decisions may be binding or non-binding

depending upon the parties’ agreement. Non-binding arbitration is the second most
common type of ADR used by the EPA in Superfund disputes (EPA 1999). The EPA is
only allowed to use binding arbitration in small CERCLA claims of less than $500,000.

Facilitation: Facilitation is a voluntary, informal and flexible process of communication
guided by a third-party neutral.

Facilitation can be used for meeting management

purposes, or as a technique to engage parties in a productive discussion about a
problem or challenge. By itself, facilitation may or may not result in resolution of any
issues in controversy.
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Convening: Convening is a process used to identify issues, interests, and sometimes
parties involved in a dispute or potential dispute. The goal of convening is to assess the
potential for use of ADR techniques in seeking resolution of a problem and to
recommend a process that would best help address the issues at hand.

Early Neutral Evaluation: Early neutral evaluation allows the disputing parties to receive
informal neutral evaluation of the strength of each party’s position in a matter in
controversy. The evaluation is nonbinding, but may be useful in promoting settlement.

Consensus Processes: A consensus process is any method by which all affected
parties (stakeholders) are brought together at an early stage to develop a solution to a
present or anticipated problem. Consensus processes that qualify as ADR involve a
third-party neutral in a facilitation or mediation role. The term “consensus process” as
used at the EPA typically refers to a mechanism for policy or regulatory development.

Cooperative Problem Solving: Cooperative problem solving involves a decision by
parties facing a disagreement or potential disagreement to collaborate on a solution
rather than insist on competition and compromise.

Cooperative problem solving

assisted by neutrals from within or outside of the EPA has been useful in addressing
internal problems and challenges.
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Interest-Based Process: An interest-based process seeks to generate creative solutions
to problems between parties in an ongoing relationship. It makes extensive use of
brainstorming and identification of creative solutions to address the interest of the
participants.

Ombudsman or Ombuds: An ombudsman (or ombud) is an EPA official who is
authorized to accept complaints and look into whether something can be done to
address a particular concern. Ombuds do not have authority to change decisions, but
they try to facilitate responsive solutions to problems raised in complaints. There are
currently ombud functions in three programs at EPA: pesticides, hazardous waste, and
small business.

While ADR is used across a number of EPA programs, it is most frequently used as a
settlement tool during the Superfund enforcement process. Its use is advocated not
only as a means for facilitating PRP negotiations, but as an approach to allow greater
public participation in EPA decision-making. Mediated discussions between PRPs and
the EPA (or between PRPs themselves) are used to initially establish liability, penalties,
allocate costs, and to assure acceptance of responsibility by PRPs. Most frequently,
ADR is used to address: penalty amounts (49%); cost recovery (15%); allocation of
costs among PRPs (10%); remedial design and/or remedial action negotiations (7%),
and community involvement (5%) (EPA 1999).

Overall, ADR is used in a small minority of Superfund cases because most are settled
through

direct

negotiations

between

representatives of the EPA and the PRPs
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without having to bring in a third party neutral or resorting to court action. The EPA
reports a 95% success rate during such unaided negotiations, so a relatively small
number of cases proceed to either ADR or litigation (EPA 1987). When ADR is used,
the EPA claims that outcomes (quality of the ultimate settlement) are similar to those
reached through litigation and negotiation. EPA asserts that since ADR addresses only
the process (and not the substance) of case resolution, its use does not lead to more
lenient results for violators (EPA 1987).

According to EPA policy, ADR is not meant to replace traditional litigation or unassisted
negotiation, but as a supplement. It is used when traditional negotiations seem likely to
fail, have already failed, or to expedite negotiations and promote efficiency.

It is

sometimes applied only to discrete parts of a particular case or may be used in a series
of cases. It is also used during the discovery phase to assist parties in understanding
the strengths and weaknesses of the case (EPA 1987).

ADR procedures may be initiated at any point as a case proceeds or while litigation is
pending. However, EPA staff is encouraged to consider its use as early as possible in
the progress of the case to avoid the divisive effects of protracted negotiations and
lawsuits. If a case seems appropriate, efforts are made to employ ADR before referring
a case for legal action. There are, however, times when cases which have been
pending in court for a number of years without significant movement toward resolution
are referred for ADR.
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The literature contains few studies looking specifically at the EPA’s use of ADR in
Superfund enforcement or related actions. Abbott (1990) found that though the EPA
successfully used ADR during the enforcement process, there was reluctance on the
part of EPA officials to use ADR and distrust among PRPs for ADR-based settlements.
In a study of institutional barriers to the adoption of ADR by the EPA, O’Leary and
Raines (2001) found that despite the official policy promoting the use of ADR, its use
was the exception rather than the rule. The same study found that the use of ADR was
based more on each attorney’s comfort and knowledge of ADR than objective factors.
However, in interviews conducted with EPA officials and PRPs who had been engaged
in ADR, there was a high degree of satisfaction (O’Leary and Raines 2001). Charla and
Parry (1991) evaluated the advantages and disadvantages of ADR, concluding that
desirable outcomes would likely result only if ADR was properly utilized.

B.8. Factors Known to Affect the Use of ADR by the EPA
B.8.a Case Characteristics
In the review process, each case is analyzed to determine whether ADR is appropriate.
The reviewer typically considers whether the violations are well substantiated by the
evidence in the case and whether there is sufficient time (from the standpoint of
statutory time requirements) to conduct ADR negotiations.

The case must also be

considered negotiable, i.e., no precedent-setting issues are involved. After nomination
and approval at the regional level, the case is referred to the Department of Justice for
final consent. Personnel assigned to the case then approach the PRPs, gain their
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acceptance of the process, and proceed to implement the chosen ADR approach.
PRPs frequently use ADR among themselves to allocate costs before meeting with the
EPA (Hyatt 1995). While regional personnel use their own judgment and experience to
evaluate the ADR potential of cases, EPA policy particularly encourages it under the
following circumstances:

•

When negotiations have reached an impasse or there is a strong potential for
impasse - This may occur due to such factors as personality conflicts, the
presence of a large number of PRPs that make negotiations unwieldy; difficult
technical issues that would benefit from independent analysis; or long delays in
court rulings;

•

In cases with broad impact or high visibility such as when remedies are proposed
that directly affect communities or local governments rather than only the PRPs.
This is becoming more common as EPA places greater emphasis on public
participation in major remedy selection decisions. Such cases might include
cases in which state or local governments have expressed a particular interest,
but are not a party; those in which there is a particularly high level of citizen
interest; or ones in which the remedy is likely to affect not only the violator, but
the community in which the violator is located (e.g., those cases in which the
contamination is wide-spread, leading to a portion of the remedy being
conducted off-site).
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Certain circumstances also make the use of ADR unlikely. These include disputes
where a definitive legal precedent is needed; where government policy is unclear;
where the case is considered to be of special importance (apparently this factor can
make ADR either more or less likely depending on the nature of the importance); where
ADR might result in inconsistent results; where the outcome will have a significant affect
on parties who would not be involved in the ADR proceeding; where a full public record
is important; and where the EPA needs to maintain full control over the outcome
(Gullace 2001).

B.8.b EPA Regional Variations
The EPA policy on use of ADR in Superfund enforcement reflects the subjectivity of the
decision to use or not to use ADR.

Within the EPA’s Office of Enforcement and

Compliance Assurance (OECA), it is the policy to try to use ADR in every enforcement
and compliance dispute whenever it could lead to more efficient or equitable
resolutions. However, the policy goes on to say that if the decision to use ADR is made,
it must reflect an assessment of the specific parties, issues and other factors.

While

PRPs may request that EPA consider the use of ADR, the decision by EPA to use or
participate in ADR is made on a case-by-case basis by the regional EPA staff
responsible for handling the particular case with oversight from higher level government
decision makers.

ADR use varies considerably across the ten EPA regions.

A report by the GAO

indicated “the data show variations among the regions in implementing this reform that
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do not correspond with differences in the sizes of their Superfund workloads”. The
report was unable to determine the degree to which opportunities for using ADR were
being missed as managers in the regions did not track this (GAO 2000). In a separate
study, Church and Nakamura (1993) found that the Superfund dispute resolution
approaches varied by region with regions II and V tending to take a more prosecutorial,
litigation-based approach; regions X and III tending to be settlement-oriented; and
region IV seeing Superfund more as a public works program. Overall, interviews with
EPA personnel have shown that the use of ADR depends on advocacy by those who
have a personal interest in ADR and have the ability to persuade others to use it
(O’Leary and Raines 2001).

EPA regions have implemented ADR programs to meet their particular needs. In some
regions, ADR is organized more generically across different programs or areas. Some
offices have staff experts to coordinate all ADR for a variety of unrelated areas such as
in non-Superfund environmental programs, in the resolution of workplace disputes, to
help in organizational problem-solving, as well as in Superfund cases (EPA 2000b).

B.9. ADR and Environmental Justice
Whether ADR, in this context, is an approach that supports environmental justice is still
open to debate. A report by the Consensus Building Institute (2003), reviewed the use
of ADR techniques to address environmental justice concerns. Through the review of
six case studies, the report points out instances in which communities capitalized on
environmental crises to improve environmental conditions, alter community-corporate
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relations, and give greater voice to the interests of those residing in what are typically
low-income communities of color. The authors note that, in general, environmental
justice concerns have not been handled successfully through litigation. They point out
that litigation is expensive; that it heightens the dependency experienced by victims of
environmental justice; that it can increase the sense of isolation experienced by victims
because it focuses on a few plaintiffs rather than the broader interests of the
community; and that legal victories do not automatically translate into long term effective
monitoring to ensure that remedies are enforced. The conclusion of the report is that
there is clear evidence that community leaders are learning how to effectively use ADR
as a means of pursuing environmental justice (Consensus Building Institute 2003).

An assessment by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights is not as favorable.

The

Commission has suggested that ADR may not serve to advance environmental justice
because it does not address certain underlying power inequities. They state that ADR
fails to provide for the equal exchange of information (as in litigation); fails to provide
any structure for a legal precedent; focuses on individual disputes rather than larger
patterns of inequity; and does not address the unique cultural concerns of many
minority communities. The Commission points out that community groups do not have
the same level of knowledge about technical (remediation) issues, have less experience
with negotiation, and that ADR favors groups with more money and greater availability
to technical resources. This may lead to situations where disadvantaged groups are
coerced into settlements that are not in their best interests (USCOCR 2003). In answer
to these charges, the EPA claims to have instituted certain safeguards to address the
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power imbalance, such as allowing all parties to have a voice in the choice of third party
neutrals, training on how to effectively participate in ADR processes, technical advice,
and funding through Technical Assistance Grants.

Other ADR critics suggest points of view that echo the concerns of the Civil Rights
Commission. Some are suspicious of ADR techniques, viewing them as largely
cooperative and demobilizing for citizen groups (Amy 1987) or as another instance of
interest group bargaining that does not actually promote broader public discourse
(Landy, Roberts, and Thomas 1990). Some have also suggested that the George W.
Bush administration may be promoting ADR in an insincere effort to calm and seduce
environmentalists (O’Leary, Nabatchi, and Bingham 2005).

The scarcity of empirical data on ADR outcomes makes it difficult to draw firm
conclusions on the extent to which these techniques further the cause of environmental
justice.

More work is needed to link ADR to objective environmental outcomes in

disadvantaged communities to enable valid conclusions on this question.

B.10. Community Involvement (CI) at Superfund Sites
When CERCLA was first enacted, a strong community relations component was
envisioned as an integral part of cleanup efforts, even though analyses of risk, available
technologies, and costs posed many complex problems that the layperson could not
easily understand. However, the political climate and the leadership in the EPA in the
early 1980’s under Reagan greatly diluted the strength of community relations efforts
and

participatory

policies

were

substantially downgraded (Sirianni and
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Friedland 1995). The approach at the EPA remained very much a “top-down” one,
where citizens could comment and advise, but had no decision-making power.

In

dealing with community residents, EPA officials often behaved defensively to avoid
causing further alarm or creating additional government liability through admissions of
the degree of environmental danger. Information was often withheld or presented in
unnecessarily technical terms, fueling the mistrust, dependence, and anger among local
residents (Sirianni and Friedland 1995).

With the passage of SARA in 1986, community relations policies were strengthened.
SARA required public input into the selection of all cleanup plans through meetings and
comment periods. It also required EPA staff to publicly explain the range of possible
cleanup alternatives, justify alternatives chosen, and consider comments, criticisms and
new data submitted by the public (Sirianni and Friedland 1995).

EPA public documents indicate that the agency sees itself as having gone from simply
providing information to the public in 1980, to listening to public comments in 1986, to
actually involving the public in decision-making in 1994. However, some still feel that
community relations at the EPA falls considerably short of the desired level of public
participation. Sirianni and Friedland (1995) contend that as long as innovative aspects
of EPA community relations are discretionary and under-funded, staff will tend to focus
attention on communities that are the most vocal.

In environmental disputes, giving a voice to members of a contaminated community is
highly important for a number of reasons.

The
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inclusion

of

public

values

into

decision-making is a key component of democracy. Lack of inclusion can be a driving
force behind challenges to authority. Biederle and Cayford (2003) points out that there
are often significant differences in opinion and risk perception between lay citizens and
experts and that public participation is widely viewed as increasing the quality of
environmental decision-making.

Community members can also provide important

information, identify mistakes, and generate creative solutions that lead to broader
community satisfaction (Biederle 2003).

From a practical perspective, community

residents can help greatly in identifying PRPs due to their familiarity with the history of
the area and of the site.

Some communities have more difficulty than others in becoming engaged in a collective
action process. Petrie (2006) found that sites with a greater percentage of racial and
ethnic minorities are less likely to participate in remediation decisions, while low income
communities were more likely to participate in remediation. Effective participation in
environmental decision-making requires the parties to be well informed about the issues
and able to clearly voice their concerns about potential risk.

In disadvantaged

communities, communication may be difficult due to cultural and language differences,
thereby engendering mistrust to and misunderstandings.

Participation may also be

impeded by an inability to grasp the complex jargon and data inherent to environmental
issues. Members of such communities may have insufficient time and resources (such
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as childcare, release from work, and transportation) to enable participation. However,
at least one study reported that poverty tended to make community involvement in
administrative decision making more probable (Stephan 2005).

B.10.a EPA Programs to Promote Community Involvement
To address the need for public input, the EPA developed programs to increase
stakeholder involvement and to promote participatory decision-making. The EPA
operates a Community Involvement Program within the Office of Solid Waste and
Emergency Response (OSWER). This program manages the use of dispute resolution
professionals to assist the participation of the affected public in EPA decisions,
particularly relating to Superfund site remediation. A variety of initiatives are supported
by the Community Involvement Program, including the availability of facilitation or
mediation services on a “just-in-time” basis to address specific site problems or general
concerns about the Superfund program (EPA 2000a).

The EPA uses a Community Involvement Plan to detail how the remedial team will
involve the community and what the community’s role will be at each step in site
remediation (EPA 2008). Along with traditional strategies such as public notices, public
hearings, and ongoing community outreach, EPA encourages the development of
Community Advisory Groups (CAGS) at certain Superfund sites and funds local
initiatives through Technical Advisory Grants (TAGS). TAGS can be in amounts up to
$50,000 to allow communities to hire independent experts to help them interpret
technical data.
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B.10.b Effect of Community Involvement on the Remediation Process
Community involvement is generally seen as beneficial in producing higher quality
outcomes. Many case studies report increased community satisfaction as a result of
inclusion within the Superfund decision-making process (EPA 1999).

Community

pressure affects the degree to which the EPA takes action to place a site on the NPL
and the adoption of stringent remediation approaches (Hamilton and Viscusi 1999).
Daley (2007) reports that when controlling for other factors, the EPA is more likely to
choose health protective clean-up approaches when CAGs and TAGs have been
formed at Superfund sites.

Charnley and Englebert (2005) studied the outcomes of Superfund’s Community
Involvement Program. Their findings were mixed, but in general, community members
who were most informed about and involved in the cleanup process at Superfund sites
were also the most satisfied with the community involvement process and the job that
EPA was doing in cleaning up the site. The EPA acknowledges that further evaluation
of its community involvement activities is needed (EPA 2001).

However, some researchers have found that that public involvement at Superfund sites
can also be associated with decreased remedial progress and less desirable forms of
cleanup (Daley and Layton 2004; Petrie 2006). This is thought to be largely due to
differences in opinion among community members leading to conflict and the
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disintegration of community relations (Shriver and Kennedy 2005). The emergence of
contentious community factions may contribute to less effective cleanup as disputes
linger for many years.

In relation to ADR, community members who took part in collaborative environmental
dispute settlement processes felt that they had used their resources more effectively
than they would have if more adversarial approaches had been undertaken (Crowfoot
and Wondolleck 1990). They believed that their organizations and their personal skills
had been strengthened and that doors had been opened for continued dialogue with
industry. In several of the case studies reviewed, community participants gained a role
in implementing and monitoring the final cleanup decisions (Crowfoot and Wondolleck
1990).
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C. METHODOLOGY
This

research

was

sociodemographic

aimed

at

characteristics

understanding
influence

the
the

way

in

which

use

of

community

ADR/CI

versus

settlement/litigation in the Superfund remediation and enforcement processes. ADR
and CI are both considered non-adversarial dispute resolution tactics as compared to
traditional mechanisms (settlement/litigation).

ADR and CI are looked at together

because both involve higher levels of community participation and input as compared to
settlement or litigation.

Dispute Resolution Options

Settlement

Litigation

ADR

Low

CI
High

Level of Community Participation

Figure: 1 Continuum of EPA Superfund Site Dispute Resolution Options

By examining the relationship between the sociodemographic profile of Superfund
communities and the type of dispute resolution, I seek to answer the following question:
Does the class or race of Superfund site residents affect the likelihood that ADR/CI will
occur during the site cleanup and enforcement processes?
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Hypothesis 1.

ADR/CI, as opposed to settlement/litigation, is less likely to occur in

Superfund communities with high poverty levels than in those with low poverty
levels;

Hypothesis 2.

ADR/CI, as opposed to settlement/litigation, is less likely to occur in

Superfund communities with higher minority representation than in those with
lower minority representation;

Hypothesis 3.

ADR/CI, as opposed to settlement/litigation, is less likely to occur in

Superfund communities with more single parent households than in those with
less single parent households;

Hypothesis 4.

ADR/CI, as opposed to settlement/litigation, is less likely to occur in

Superfund communities with less formal education than in those with more formal
education.

As discussed earlier, the rationale for these hypotheses is based on behavioral
expectations of both the EPA and community residents. ADR/CI may be initiated or
encouraged by either the EPA or by community activists. In high minority, low income
areas with low political power, EPA bureaucrats may have lower motivation to seek the
active involvement required by ADR/CI and may tend to reach settlement with PRPs
more easily.
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In relation to community initiated actions, ADR/CI requires disputants to possess
various organizational and political skills (making timely phone calls, getting ADR/CI
regional specialist involvement, getting sponsorship from Regional Counsel, and
ultimate approval from EPA officers); it is unlikely that communities with depressed
socioeconomic status or higher minority populations in historically disadvantaged
situations will have the time or financial resources to accomplish the steps required to
initiate and follow through with ADR/CI initiatives (USCOCR 2003). In addition, such
communities may have difficulty understanding technical documents due to low
educational levels.

To answer the research question, I downloaded the EPA’s CERCLIS file as of
November 2007, geocoded it to identify the census tract in which each site was located,
and joined it with sociodemographic data from the Census 2000 file. This allowed me to
know the census tract for every site within CERCLIS, the sociodemographic profile of
the census tract, and to analyze the relationship between the dependent variables and
these characteristics.

To reiterate, CERCLIS contains sites that have been prioritized

for cleanup as well as potentially hazardous sites requiring preliminary investigation.
EPA removes sites from active status within CERCLIS when the site is designated as
No Further Response Action Planned (NFRAP). Information for CERCLIS is provided
primarily by the regional program offices, through a Regional Information Management
Coordinator.
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While the entire CERCLIS database was initially downloaded, only a subset of
CERCLIS was used in this research. The records analyzed included only those relating
to sites where remediation/enforcement had actually occurred.

For these records,

analyses compared sites where ADR or CI occurred to sites where settlement or
litigation was used (n=2,454). As noted, many of the sites within CERCLIS did not
include any of these variables (ADR, CI, settlement or litigation) resulting in their
exclusion from these analyses. This could be due to a number of reasons, including the
possibility that they are orphan sites with no identifiable PRPs, because they are too
early in the process, or because there are other unknown factors leading to inaction.

C.1. Data
C.1.a Accessing and Geocoding the EPA Superfund Data
The CERCLIS database as a whole contains over 12,000 active or archived Superfund
sites. All historic and current Superfund data are publicly available.

The complete

database was downloaded and received in the form of 50 separate database files.
These files can be used with any database management software, including Microsoft
Access and SPSS.

Within these 50 database files, the “site” file contains all geographic Superfund site
information. It includes the site’s name and address, including street, city, state and 5digit zip code as well as various other geographic-type variables (congressional district,
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USGS Hydrocodes, etc).

This file was used to establish each site’s census tract

location using a batch geocoding process available through the company Teleatlas
(www.geocode.com).

Teleatlas is a highly reputable company used by the US Census Bureau to establish
census tract location information for individual addresses. Teleatlas’ batch geocoding
process uses geographic information system techniques to establish census tract
location from a street address. Using the street address is the desirable way to conduct
a geocoding process. Yet, if a street address fails to match, then the batch geocode
process uses a secondary method to estimate the census tract using what is referred to
as a zip code centroid. Although this is less accurate, the centroid method takes into
account relative population loads within a given zip code and establishes what is
referred to as a “balance point”. The location of this balance point corresponds with the
census tract that is assigned to the record. If there is a failure to code at the zip code
level using the aforementioned centroid process, then no coding is completed for the
record.

Overall, the geocoding matching process was successful with only six percent of the file
failing to match. All Superfund addresses (12,071 records) were uploaded into the
Teleatlas system and evaluated using the batch coding method. Table one shows the
outcome of the Teleatlas geocoding process completed on the EPA’s file that contains
the Superfund site geographic information.
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Table 1: Geocoding Match Types of Superfund Site Geographic Data
(n=12,071)
Street address match
42%
Centroid match
52%
Failure to match
6%
C.1.b Accessing ADR Information by Superfund Site
Additional information within CERCLIS allows one to determine what types of actions
were taken at a given site. The “action” file shows every type of action completed during
a site’s life course through the Superfund program. ADR is an example of an action
documented in this file.

Other actions of interest include CI and various forms of

litigation and settlement. By creating Microsoft Access queries, one can work within the
action file to isolate the actions of interest. The action file was used to create the
dependent variable for use in subsequent statistical testing. The dependent variable for
this research was created in a binary fashion using several site actions.

Table 2: Dependent Variable Definitions2—Community Involvement (Code=1)
EPA
Action
Code
CR

2

EPA Action
Code Title

EPA Action Code Definition

Community
Involvement

The community relations activities, i.e. plan, implementation and responsiveness
summary that must be completed at a site to address community concerns.

Carol Quinn from the EPA CERCLIS Database department was contacted to provide additional clarity
on all Superfund site actions.
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Table 3: Dependent Variable Definitions—Alternative Dispute Resolution (Code=1)
EPA
Action
Code
AD

EPA Action
Code Title
Alternative
Dispute
Resolution

EPA Action Code Definition
Decision to take cost recovery action by use of Alternative Dispute Resolution
(ADR) including mediation, arbitration and mini-trial.

Table 4: Dependent Variable Definitions—Litigation (Code=0)
EPA
Action
Code
SV
SX

LT

EPA Action
Code Title
Section 107
Litigation
Section 106
Litigation
Litigation
(Generic)

EPA Action Code Definition
Judicial referral under S107 to recovery from Potentially Responsible Parties
(PRPs)
Judicial referral without settlement to compel Potentially Responsible Parties
(PRPs) to do response work. Referral can also seek compliance with a previous
settlement or order.
This activity is used to code referrals for litigation that cover any combination of
remedies or statutes (CERCLA, SARA, RCRA) not reflected in the conventional
activity types of SX (Section 106), SV (Section 107) CL (combined 106/107,and
SF (Sect ion 104). If preferred, this activity can be used to code all referral types
instead of using the conventional SX, SV, CL, SF codes. Because this activity is
generic, coding the statutes (statute) and the remedy types (remedy) correctly is
mandatory. All other edit checks and coding requirements that apply to SX, SV,
CL, and SF apply to LT as well. Examples: action=LT, statute=106, remedy=RA
is equivalent to SX; action=LT, statute=107, remedy=VA is equivalent to SV;
action=LT, statute=10 6,107, remedy=VD, RA is equivalent to CL; action=LT,
statute=104, remedy=SE, DE is equivalent to SF; action=LT, statute=104, 107,
106, remedy=DE, VM, RD, RA, is a combination not covered by SX, SV, CL, SF.
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Table 5: Dependent Variable Definitions—Settlement (Code=0)
EPA
Action
Code
CD

CA
SD

EPA Action Code
Title
Consent Decree

Consent Agreement
(Administrative)
State Consent
Decree

UA

Unilateral
Administrative
Order

AC

Administrative
Order On Consent

ST

Settlement
(Generic)

EPA Action Code Definition
Judicial agreement between the Federal government and the Potentially
Responsible Parties (PRPs) fully or partially settling a claim under
CERCLA. This agreement may settle litigation or may be presented
concurrently with the complaint (achieved through negotiations). The
agreement may be for response work, cost recovery, or both.
Informal agreement used to initiate Potentially Responsible Party (PRP)
response or cost recovery.
Judicial agreement between a State and the potentially Responsible
Parties (PRPs) fully or partially settling a claim under CERCLA. The
settlement may be for response work, cost recovery, or both.
Administrative order issued by EPA unilaterally (under Section 106 of
SARA). Unilateral orders can compel Potentially Responsible Parties
(PRPs) to conduct removal, remedial investigation/feasibility study,
remedial design/remedial action, and may include cost recovery.
Commonly abbreviated UAO.
A voluntary and enforceable agreement pursuant to CERCLA, signed by
EPA and Potentially Responsible Parties (PRPs), whereby the PRPs
agree to perform and/or pay for some or all of the response costs
involved in site cleanup. The order describes the PRP response to be
taken at a site, stipulated penalties, indemnification, effective date, and
may be subject to public comment. It can be for removal, Remedial
Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS), Remedial Design (RD), and
Remedial Action (RA), pre-SARA; but only removal and RI/FS, postSARA.
This action is used to code settlements that cover any combination of
specific enforcement related settlements.

In this analysis there are 535 Superfund sites having at least one documented ADR or
CI and 1,919 sites having at least one documented litigation or settlement action. Once
these actions were isolated within Microsoft Access queries, the ADR information was
integrated with the geocoded file.

C.1.c Incorporating Census Tract-Level Demographics into the Geocoded File
This research incorporates census tract-level demographic information related to each
Superfund site location. Demographic data was garnered from two sources: the 2000
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US Census summary file three (Census 2000) and the Public Heath Disparities
Geocoding Project Monograph (PHDGPM) (Krieger, Waterman, Chen, Rehkoph, and
Subramianian 2000). Using SPSS syntax developed by the Interuniversity Consortium
for Political and Social Research (ICPSR), the US Census data was incorporated
(USDOC, Bureau of the Census 2002). Census tract-level poverty data are publically
available via the PHDGPM. The PHDGPM provided a text file with the proportion of
poverty (based on the 2000 US Census) for each of country’s approximately 65,000
unique census tracts. 3 The incorporation of census-tract demographic information
creates a demographic profile corresponding to each Superfund site.

C.1.d Variables Used for Analysis Purposes
The goals of this research were to establish the sociodemographic characteristics of
communities where the EPA has used non-adversarial dispute resolution tactics in the
context of Superfund site remediation.

Therefore relevant variables were selected

based on ADR/CI and EJ literature. The EJ literature shows that racial minorities,
people who live in urban environments, and those with lower socioeconomic status are
more likely to live in contaminated communities (Bullard, Mohai, Saha, and Wright/UCC
2007).

For this reason, minority status, urbanization level, and poverty status are

included in the analysis.

3

This work was funded by the National Institutes of Health (1RO1HD36865-01) via the National Institute
of Child Health & Human Development (NICHD) and the Office of Behavioral & Social Science Research
(OBSSR). Copyright © 2004 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College - The Public Health
Disparities Geocoding Project.
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Specifically in the context of Superfund sites, community power is noted as a factor in
how the EPA prioritizes one site’s cleanup over another (O’Neil 2005). For this reason,
single parenthood and educational attainment are also included as independent
variables as they are often associated with community power.

The educational

attainment variable looks at community members who have less than a high school
education.

The EPA administers the Superfund program regionally. There are standard practices
related to dispute resolution in all 10 EPA regions yet, there is considerable
management freedom when it comes to dispute resolution specifics. Therefore, the 10
EPA regions are included within the analysis model.
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Table 6: Variable Calculations

Independent Variables*
1. Minority Status: Proportion of residents who are non-White (African American, Asian/Pacific Islander,
Native American, Other)
Source: 2000 US Census
Variable Calculation: (P6_1 – P6_2)/P6_1
2. Urbanization Level: Proportion of residents who live in an urban setting (compared to a rural setting).
Source: 2000 US Census
Variable Calculation: P5_2/P5_1
3. Poverty Status: Proportion of residents who live in poverty.
Source: PHDGPM
(no calculation necessary)
4. Educational attainment: Proportion of residents with less than a high school degree (GED). Source:
2000 US Census
Variable Calculation: (P37_3 + P37_4 + … + P37_10 + P37_20 + … + P37_27)/P37_1
5. Single Parenthood: Proportion of residents who are single parents (mothers or fathers) with children
under the age of 18 years.
Source: 2000 US Census
Variable Calculation: (P12_9 + P12_27 + P12_9 + P12_12)/P12_1
6. EPA Region: Regions are 10 groups of states defined by the EPA.
Source: EPA
Variable Calculation: Dummy variables created for each of the 10 regions.

Dependent Variable*
1. ADR/CI vs. Settlement/Litigation: The EPA used ADR or community involvement dispute resolution
techniques in an effort to resolve Superfund-related conflicts=1. The EPA used litigation or
settlement in an effort to resolve Superfund-related conflicts=0. (See tables 2-5 for specific variable
definitions)
Source: EPA (no calculation necessary)
* (USDOC/Bureau of the Census 2002)
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D. RESULTS
Means (incidence calculations) and standard deviations of all variables in the analysis
are presented in table 7.

Educational attainment, single parenthood, minority status,

poverty status, and urbanization level are incidence calculations with a possible range
of 0 to 1. Twenty-three percent of Superfund communities have less than a high school
education (s.d.=0.13), 10 percent of Superfund community households are led by single
parents with children less than 18 years of age (s.d.=0.07), 24 percent of Superfund
communities are represented by people classified in minority groups (non-White)
(s.d.=0.26), 15 percent of Superfund communities are living in poverty (s.d.=0.12) and
77 percent are in cities (s.d.=0.36). The series of dummy variables that addresses the
EPA region where a Superfund-community is located are coded according to the details
in table 4. The 10 EPA regions vary in the proportion of the country that they represent
and, in total, 100 percent of the country is represented within these ten regions.
Twenty-two percent of sites used ADR/CI, while 78 percent used settlement/litigation to
resolve Superfund-related disputes.
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Table 7: Means and Standard Deviations of Variables in the Analysis (n=2454)

Independent Variables
1. Minority Status – Source: US Census
(Incidence of minorities – African American,
Asian-Pacific Islander, Native American, and
other)
2. Urbanization level – Source: US Census
(Incidence of urban vs. rural local)
3. Poverty Status – Source: PHDGPM
(Incidence of poverty)
4. Educational Attainment – Source: US Census
(Incidence of people with less than high school
graduate)
5. Single Parenthood – Source: US Census
(Incidence of single parent households w/kids
less than 18 years)
6. EPA Region (series of dummy variables) –
Source: EPA
Region 1: (1=ME, MA, RI, CT, VT, NH)
Region 2: (1=NY, NJ)
Region 3: (1=PA, WV, VA, DE, MD, DC)
Region 4: (1=KY, TN, NC, SC, MS, AL, GA,
FL)
Region 5: (1=MN, WI, MI, IL, IN, OH)
Region 6: (1=NM, OK, TX, AR, LA)
Region 7: (1=IA, NB, KS, MO)
Region 8: (1=ND, SD, MT, WY, UT, CO)
Region 9: (1=HI, CA, NV, AZ)
Region 10: (1=AK, WA, OR, ID)
Dependent Variable
1. ADR/CI vs. Settlement/Litigation – Source:
EPA (1=ADR/CI;0=settlement/litigation used in
dispute resolution)

Overall
Mean

ADR
Mean

Settlm’t/
Litigat’n
Mean

(Incidence)

Overall
SD

(Incidence)

(Incidence)

24%

0.26

18%

26%

77%

0.36

73%

79%

15%

0.12

13%

15%

23%

0.13

20%

24%

10%

0.07

9%

11%

6%
11%
13%

0.24
0.31
0.33

7%
7%
12%

6%
12%
13%

16%
23%
7%
9%
5%
7%
3%

0.37
0.42
0.25
0.29
0.22
0.25
0.18

6%
22%
10%
16%
10%
6%
4%

19%
23%
6%
7%
4%
7%
3%

22%

0.41

NA

NA

Binary logistic regression is used to test the hypothesis that ADR/CI is less likely to
occur in communities with a higher incidence of minority populations and those with
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higher poverty rates as related to resolution of Superfund-related disputes. The model
as a whole is significant at a p<0.01 level. The results of the binary logistic regression
are presented in table 8.

Table 8: Binary Logistic Regression Coefficients (Likelihood of Using ADR/CI to Resolve
Superfund-Related Disputes)
Odds of Using
ADR/CI
Minority Status – Source: US Census
(Incidence of minorities – African American, Asian-Pacific Islander, Native
American, and other)
Poverty Status – Source: PHDGPM
(Incidence of poverty)
Single Parenthood – Source: US Census
(Incidence of single parent households w/kids less than 18 years)
Urban level– Source: US Census
(Incidence of urban vs. rural local)
Educational Attainment – Source: US Census
(Incidence of people with less than high school graduate)
EPA Region 1: (1=ME, MA, RI, CT, VT, NH)
EPA Region 2: (1=NY, NJ)
EPA Region 3: (1=PA, WV, VA, DE, MD, DC)
EPA Region 4: (1=KY, TN, NC, SC, MS, AL, GA, FL)
EPA Region 5: (1=MN, WI, MI, IL, IN, OH)
EPA Region 6: (1=NM, OK, TX, AR, LA)
EPA Region 7: (1=IA, NB, KS, MO)
EPA Region 8: (1=ND, SD, MT, WY, UT, CO)
EPA Region 9: (1=HI, CA, NV, AZ)
Constant
-2 log likelihood
N
R2

-0.333 (.316)

0.147 (.846)
0.103 (.936)
-0.229 (.115)
-1.879 (.002)**
0.021 (.948)
-0.620 (.049)*
-0.086 (.771)
-1.060 (.001)**
-0.036 (.898)
0.754 (.016)*
0.712 (.015)*
0.797 (.012)*
0.104 (.759)
-0.660 (.022)*
2406.501
2454
0.101

*Statistical significance at p< 0.05
**Statistical significance at p< 0.01

Although the results (table 8) do not show statistically significant support for either
hypothesis I, II, or III they do show that when controlling for the effects of poverty status,
single parenthood, minority status, urbanization level, and EPA region, communities
with a higher incidence of people with less than a high school education are 1.9 times

52

less likely to live in a Superfund-community where ADR/CI was used to resolve
Superfund-related disputes (hypothesis IV). This difference is statistically significant at
the 0.01 level.

Other significant predictors of ADR/CI use when compared to settlement/litigation usage
include being located in EPA region 6, 7, or 8. Communities located in region 2 and 4
are less likely to use ADR/CI when resolving Superfund-related environmental disputes.
Urbanization level, minority status, and family structure are not significantly related to
the odds of ADR/CI use once the other variables in the analysis are taken into account.

Since there were significant findings in EPA regions 2, 4, 6, 7, and 8, further analysis
was completed within regions to ascertain whether or not the statistically significant
education attainment finding remained. This was not the case. Within regions, most (if
not all) statistically significant findings were not present.

This indicates that the

independent variables included in the model do not explain the variation within EPA
regions. Further study should be conducted to understand why some EPA regions are
more (or less) predisposed to ADR/CI usage in Superfund site dispute resolution.
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E. DISCUSSION
Race and class are pervasive themes within the current EJ literature. This suggested
that race and class were variables that should logically be studied at the intersection of
ADR and EJ. For this reason, race and class comprised the main focus of my stated
hypotheses. The analyses conducted do not support the stated research hypotheses.
This shows that although minority and lower class communities are more likely to live in
contaminated areas, to experience a lower quality cleanup process, and to receive
fewer federal cleanup dollars (Bullard, Mohai, Saha, and Wright/UCC 2007; O’Neil
2005), I cannot conclude that the dispute resolution processes studied here are
contributing to such environmental injustices. Minority status and poverty levels do not
impact the likelihood that the collaborative dispute resolution methods studied here will
occur.

Although the analysis did not support hypothesis one, two, or three, the significant
finding related to educational attainment (hypothesis 4) is notable. Communities with
low levels of educational attainment (less than graduating from HS) could face the same
types of limited power and disadvantage as those historically associated with issues of
race and class. According to the Collective Interest Theory as related to environmental
activism, it is known that people will act collectively if they believe in the benefits, feel
that they can actually influence outcomes, and feel that the benefits of participation
outweigh the costs (Lubell 2002). Communities with low educational attainment could
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be less likely to become involved in community activism because they are unable to
satisfy some or all of the aforementioned collective interest theory characteristics.

The findings presented by the US Commission on Civil Rights cautioning the use of
ADR in disadvantaged communities (USCOCR 2003) may not relate only to the
stereotypical disadvantages associated with race and class. Lack of education is an
important additional characteristic of a disadvantaged community.

Low levels of

educational attainment may be the paramount disadvantage to be overcome related to
the use and successful implementation of ADR techniques. This is consistent with the
finding by the US Commission on Civil Rights that disadvantaged communities are
unlikely to use technical data or research to help them participate in community-level
actions (USCOCR 2003).

Communities with less formally educated residents may be unable to complete key
steps needed to bring alternative forms of dispute resolution into their communities
and/or may be unable to actively support such processes during the time that they are
carried out. ADR and CI are both dispute resolution actions that require community
activism for maximum benefit. Conversely, litigation and settlement require little or no
community activism to accomplish dispute resolution. ADR and CI program initiation
and subsequent administration often require not only EPA support and initiative but also
the involvement of communities themselves as active participants in the entire process
from start to finish.
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F. RECOMMENDATIONS
Non-adversarial dispute resolution has a strong, positive, and easily recognizable
following according to the reviewed literature.

Yet, there are real and important

concerns related to implementation in disadvantaged communities.

The US

Commission on Civil Rights notes the importance of ADR specifically but cautions
implementers, highlighting the need for trained experts to act as community advocates
in order to prevent the scales from tipping towards the more powerful or savvy party—
almost never the community recovering from toxic exposure (USCOCR 2003).

Without the aid of trained professionals, ADR in dispossessed communities can actually
decrease the urgency of the dispute and ineffectively manage details (Delgado 1988).
Without competent expert involvement, communities could end up in an unbalanced
situation where the collaborative/participatory aspects of ADR/CI can become less
beneficial and, instead, end up favoring parties based on financial and prejudicial
characteristics (USCOCR 2003).

Despite this, there is a plethora of positive and encouraging information in the literature
about the use of ADR/CI when resolving toxic exposure disputes. The EPA has taken a
positive step toward using ADR/CI as a participatory approach in its toxic dispute
resolution efforts (Consensus Building Institute 2003). Yet, implementation needs to be
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done with care and active expert participation. The positive benefits of ADR will be lost if
dispossessed communities are left to manage on their own without the advice and
social justice work of experts.
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G. LIMITATIONS, FUTURE RESEARCH, AND CONCLUSIONS
Valid outcomes from this research depend on an accurate understanding of the
sociodemographic profile of the community in which each Superfund site is located.
The methodology used assumes that the census tract location of the Superfund site will
provide an appropriate level of detail to describe the community’s profile. This method
is considered appropriate and reputable, yet there are other methodologies that use
distance-based (Bullard, Mohai, Saha, and Wright/UCC 2007) rather than census tract
analysis methods. Redoing this project using distance-based methods could further
inform the results of this project, including assuring that the sociodemographic profiles
of Superfund communities are as accurate as possible.

This research doesn’t allow me to make a value judgment on the benefits of using
collaborative dispute resolution techniques in the context of Superfund. It relies in part
on an acceptance of the literature stating that collaborative dispute resolution tactics are
beneficial within communities when implemented responsibly. In the future, it would be
valuable to conduct a qualitative study to examine more closely how sites are chosen
for ADR/CI at the administrative level.

This could be accomplished by conducting

interviews among EPA regional coordinators. Through a guided discussion, additional
factors affecting ADR/CI usage may come to light.

There are also various questions related to ADR/CI implementation that would provide
useful information about how the use of ADR/CI impacts communities. Conducting
case-study research in a Superfund community could help answer some of the
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questions that remain following the completion of this analysis. For example, analyses
specifically targeted at understanding how educational attainment impacts the likelihood
of ADR/CI use in communities would help to explain these research findings further.
Understanding EJ concerns and working towards their solutions is an extremely
important endeavor for residents of disadvantaged communities living near toxic waste
sites and for all others who care about such issues.

Not only is it important to

understand the extent and causes of disparities in exposure, it is also paramount that
researchers, policy makers, and community leaders work together to come up with
practical approaches that will allow governments and communities to work together to
create healthy environments for all.
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